The Existence of Political Culture During the Reign of the Russian Provisional Government

“The Existence of Political Culture During the Reign of the Russian Provisional Government”

Assessing Russia’s short lived Provisional Government has always been difficult. It seems that any close study of the period leads inevitably to a series of “if only…” type of conclusions. The purpose of this essay is to stay far from predicting what could have happened with an admitted bias towards propaganda from Bolshevik/Socialist and Liberal/Pro-Provisional Government apologism alike. The argument I will make in this essay, based  on a selection of primary document readings from the Browder and Kerenskii edited The Russian Provisional Government, is that a political culture did exist during the months of the Provisional Government’s reign.

To begin with, an outline of the Provisional Government’s political culture has to be sketched. I propose that we recognize the devotion to establishing a free political realm in Russia as the first phase in the development of this political culture, and the support for the Provisional Government across virtually all party lines as an expression of this. Second was the recognition of the need for free and universal inclusion of Russia’s populace in the political world and the establishment of a rule of Law. Finally, there was belief in all camps besides those on the very far right and left-wings for the convocation of an all-inclusive Constituent Assembly and, for most, the establishment of a Democratic Republic of Russia.

The early days of the Provisional Government were hailed by most factions as the beginning of a new era of liberty and democracy in Russia. The commitment to liberal ideals by the newly formed Provisional Government is easily recognizable. In the proclamation of March 1st, 1917, of the formation of the Provisional Committee of the Duma of the Provisional Government, we see explicit expressions of the liberal goals of the new government:

The Cabinet will be guided in its present activity by the following principles:

1. Full and immediate amnesty in all political and religious cases, including terrorist attempts, military uprisings, and agrarian offenses.

2. Freedom of speech, press, unions, assembly, strikes, etc.

3. Abolition of all class, religious, and national restrictions . 1

In the Russian context, many things are remarkable in this proclamation. The structure of Russia’s state had long been such that the Orthodox church and its leadership was intricately entangled with the state. The Holy Synod of the Orthodox church, for instance, cannot be compared to the governance of the Catholic Church unless one takes a powerfully cynical view of the Catholic church. The Holy Synod was, essentially, another Bureaucratic organ of the state.  Freedom of speech and assembly can also be said to have systematically denied the Russian public by the old regime.

The foundations for some of the Provisional Government’s worst problems can also be witnessed as early on as this proclamation of the government’s birth. The amnesty extended here to those who may have participated in military uprisings may be partly self-serving for the new government. Surely, many of those who were to be integrally involved in forming this government were involved with military uprisings, as it was a Revolutionary Democracy that was being founded.

In a similar way, the granting of amnesty to terrorist made sense as well. The Socialist Revolutionary Party was a party that needed to be counted on by the new Provisional Government for its support. In fact, Aleksandr Kerenskii, a man who was to rise to the very top of the Provisional Government’s leadership, was not only involved with the Socialist Revolutionaries early in his political life, but even offered to participate in an act of terrorism for this party: “Evno Azev, the police spy who headed the Socialist Revolutionary battle organization,  rejected Kerenskii’s offer to assassinate the Tsar.”2

It is the attitude adopted by the Provisional Government towards agrarian problems that persistently haunted their social and economic programs. As one editorial would write in the aftermath of the Kornilov affair, “the tendency toward voluntary sacrifices  proved to be a utopian ideal, and the government had no sufficient power to employ compulsory measures.”3 The government, as would be seen in the coming times, would not, regardless of whether it could not, control the agrarian problems.

The promise of the new Provisional Government was taken seriously by the parties. Certain parties could easily be expected to have thrown full support behind the new government. Liberalism, even though it may have seen its popularity as already having peaked around the time of the 1905 revolution, was still alive. Parties like the Kadets were quick to ally themselves with the Provisional Government:

Citizens, trust this new government, combine your efforts, each of you to the last man; let the government which was created by the state Duma perform its great work of liberating Russia from the external foe and establishing internal peace within the country based on the principles of justice, equality, and freedom.4

The Kadets, the party most often tagged by more left-wing groups as “bourgeoisie,” found many things to like about this new government: free speech, free press, free assembly, and the loosening of class distinctions could be said to have always been at the top of the Kadets’ list of priorities in liberalizing the government. It is interesting that, considering the emphasis put by the Kadets on justice and the necessity of establishing a Rechtstaat in Russia, that they did not struggle against the granting of sweeping amnesty.

Indeed, the Kadets were projecting their own party platform onto the new Provisional Government. This is illustrated by the report of the vote by the Kadets in favor of a Democratic Parliamentary republic: “Our conception of a state regime is based on the following three principles: of the inviolability of civil liberties and civil equality; of guaranty of complete rule by popular will; and the principle of realizing the bases of social justice.”5

The Kadets soon saw their hopes realized in the resolution of the Congress on the Democratic Republic. The resolution, which was unanimously accepted, was even put forward by the Kadet Party member Professor Kokoshin:

Russia must be a democratic parliamentary Republic. Legislative powers must belong to the national representatives. At the head of the executive power must be a president of the Republic elected for a definite amount of time.6

The Russian liberals in the classic Western European mold were, needless to say, satisfied with the direction the new Government seemed to be going. There was to be no separate, distant, disaffected, ultimate power looming over the democratically elected leadership of the country for the first time in Russian history. They were not the only ones happy to participate in this new government, however.

Far left parties like the formerly terrorist Socialist Revolutionary Party were also quick to make statements in support of the new government: “The (SR) conference(s) considers it most necessary to support the Provisional Government, insofar as it fulfills the political program which it has announced.”7 In contrast to the Kadets, who wanted to appear as if in full support of the new government, the Socialist Revolutionaries tacked on a conspicuous proviso to their statement of support for the Government.

Such caveats, betraying the ambivalence of the far left to the Government,  peppered the expressions of support of the Provisional Government of many leftist parties (namely, the Mensheviks). While these moments of apparent doubt may be cited as the seeds of distrust and discontent that would ensure the failure of a Democratic Republic of Russia, this attitude was in fact held by all of the parties that chose to participate in the new government.

This was to be demonstrated by the withdrawal of the Kadets from the Government later in the year. While the Socialist Revolutionaries reserved “the right to change its attitude towards the Provisional Government should it deviate from the fulfillment of its outlined program,” the Kadets  were the ones to change its attitudes and vote no confidence in the Government with their withdrawal.

While the Kadets may have been more vocal about the need to support the Government, the Socialist revolutionaries were willing to genuinely congratulate the Government on its liberal principles:

Such a declaration (that [the Government] has not the slightest intent of taking advantage of the military situation to delay in any way the realization of reforms and legislation), speaking for the sincerity of the new Government, forces us to admit that our fatherland possesses a degree of political freedom which is at the present moment greater than the political freedom of any of the Allied or enemy states.8

Thus, it was not only out of the “necessity” that the Socialist Revolutionaries saw to join forces with other parties for self-preservatory reasons that they supported the Provisional Government: they admitted that it presented the greatest promise for a political society that Russia had ever seen. Of course, they hadn’t forgotten the tricks of the old regime, and this is perhaps partly to blame for their speed to qualify their support as conditional. Had the various groups, associations, societies, and parties made such demands on the Tsar in 1905, would there have been such sweeping counter-action of the promises originally made by Nicholas II?

The declaration of support for the Provisional Government by the Soviets echoed some of the sentiments of the Socialist Revolutionaries, but showed even more distrust of the “bourgeoisie.” This declaration had little praise for the Government: “The bourgeois parties that have currently joined the temporary committee of the state Duma are by no means burning with desire to consummate the Revolution and to realize the complete triumph of democracy.”9

The statements of distrust of the new Government made by the Soviets in their declaration also carry a tone of deeper self-preservation and paranoia than that of the Socialist Revolutionaries: “Should the Soviets of Workers’ Deputies sever all connections with the Provisional Government, the bourgeoisie will inevitably view them as the mainspring of a democratic as well as a Socialist coup d’etat… The fear of this ‘Red Phantom,’ of course, will intensify and reinforce the counterrevolutionary tendencies of the bourgeoisie…”10  The declaration is practically more of a warning to the Soviets than a genuine declaration of allegiance to the new Government, as it concludes: “Adoption of (isolationist) tactics would be a fatal mistake, bordering on suicide.”

So, we see that some parties gave nearly tacit consent to the Provisional Government, others praised it, and others (namely, the Bolsheviks) had no intention of ever trying to work within its framework. The cross-factional support for the Provisional Government in its early stages of development can be taken to be a life-sign of a fledgeling political culture.

There are certain recognizable echoes of the 1905 political thought in these statements. The Decembrists, for instance, generally would not express their hunger for power. What they wanted was the power to work within a Democratic structure. Likewise, many of the parties who gave their blessing in the early days of the revolution to the Provisional Government were anxious to work within a Republican structure for their political goals.

The Government issued another statement that could be useful to the question of political culture during the Provisional Government. The declaration of the Provisional Government reviewing its accomplishments and calling for the support and cooperation of all the vital forces in the nation was issued on April 18th, 1917, unsigned:

The Provisional Government has already achieved a series of reforms reorganizing the national life of Russia along the principles of Liberty and Justice…. A radical reorganization of local government and self-government along the broadest principles has been initiated. With respect to the organization of the army and its civil rights status, democratic reforms are being carried out which far surpass everything that has been accomplished in this direction in the freest countries of the world.11

Again, the language of the Provisional Government was clearly attempting to tie it squarely to the liberal traditions of Europe. The emphasis on “Liberty and Justice” in Government declarations is important to note when considering the contemporary political culture. These principles have long been elevated to sacred status for democratic societies. Simply acknowledging that everyone ought to have the same protection under the Law is already a giant leap forward in the direction of liberalism from the idiosyncratic methods of justice in Tsarist Russia. Likewise, the idea of “Liberty” had not always been something the Tsar’s regime acknowledged as a right to everyone. Only sixty some years before the 1917 revolution, members of the intelligentsia were denying  the vitality of human rights (witness writers like Grech and Gogol).

Emphasizing the new freedoms planned in the sphere of local government was also key to the Provisional Government in gaining the support of the various liberal camps. The Zemstvo had long been the scene of some of the most effective and brazen pro-democratic action in Russia’s history. This was naturally curbed and mitigated time and time again by the autocracy (a few examples include how there was not to be a national Zemstvo, the institution of land-captains, etc.). Nonetheless, it was in the Zemstvo that the Provisional Government’s Minister-President cut his teeth and made his name in Russia’s political world. Prince L’vov even returned to Zemstvo activism and stayed there until the time of the February Revolution after serving one term in the Duma as a Kadet.

What was to become a contentious and difficult matter for the Provisional Government is here held up as a symbol of the success in the direction of democracy: the conditions of soldiers in the army. The great degree of freedom granted to the army was to be blamed later for the “neutrality” of some of the army units in the July days and even the failure of the Provisional Government (the failure to maintain order is to blame for the Government’s collapse in such arguments).12

The wellspring of this democracy in the military was the famous order No. 1 of the Petrograd Soviet of Worker’s and Soldiers’ Deputies to the armed forces on March 1, 1917. One can observe the liberal and democratic spirit expressed in ot quite clearly: “1. In all companies, battalions, regiments, etc., committees from the elected representatives of the lower ranks of the above mentioned military units shall be chosen imediately.”13 The new expression of Russian political culture manifesting itself elsewhere in the new Provisional Government was now being manifested even in the armed forces.

Parts three and four of Order No. 1 seem to be mainly insurance for the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ deputies of its own power (e.g. “4. The orders of the State Duma shall be executed only in such cases as do not conflict with the orders and resolutions of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies”). Part seven was there mainly to “put  generals in their place.”14

Part six, with its unprecedented implications for the rights of members of the armed forces, was the most revolutionary and contentious. In it, we see more of the same confirmation of democratic principle, but in more dramatic and sweeping form than could be observed anywhere else at the time:15

6. In the ranks and during their performance of the duties of the service, soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside the service and the ranks, in their political, general civic, and private life, soldiers cannot in any way be deprived of those rights that all citizens enjoy. In particular, standing at attention and compulsory saluting, when not on duty, is abolished.16

Making soldiers equal members of the new Democracy was a grand step in the direction of liberalism on the part of the Provisional Government. Order No. 1 was immediately hailed by many as vital to the new democracy. As Izvestiia commented after its publication, Order No. 1 had changed Russia’s soldiers “from slaves into citizens.”17 It took a class of society that had never been a real citizen anywhere and brought it into a political culture that had never had involvement by any significant portion of the nation’s population. In this way, it was truly revolutionary.

Complaints about Order No. 1 were to become frequent and sharp however. The Central Committee of the Officers Union of the Army and Navy had this to say about it: “Only (the complete restoration of authority to commanders) can restore the authority of the Government, a sense of order, lawfulness, and discipline among the troops.” 18

General Ruzskii later offered the opinion that “the cause of disintegration of the army) was Order No. 1.”19 Ruzskii’s comments, made nearer the collapse of the Provisional Government, display a continuity of sentiment among the leaders of the military with the earlier telegram to the Government sent by the Officers Union. After the July Days, Tereshchenko made similar commentary: “I will say a few words about order No. 1. It is the greatest crime. Perhaps ot was provoked by the conditions of the time, but it should have been openly recognized as a mistake.”20

Proclamation of amnesty was again mentioned in the declaration. This was to become an achievement often cited in the list of things that the Government actually did. Also mentioned in the declaration reviewing the Governments achievements was the abolishment of the death penalty. The death penalty, frequently, though not always, viewed by societies embracing a greater degree of liberalism as barbaric, was something that all of the left-wing parties of Russia seemed to be proud to do away with. More conservative voices are more difficult to find being expressed in this particular period, so it is difficult to say whether or not these issues of amnesty and abolishment of the death penalty served to further alienate them. It may be safe to say at least that these actions did not help bring them closer to the left-wing majority of the government though. The death penalty was eventually reinstated after the Kornilov affair.

The final note in the review of the Provisional Government of its achievements may be the weakest, and concerns a matter that may have been integral in the Government’s collapse: “Attending to the matter of providing the army and the country with food supplies, the Government has declared the grain harvested in the current and preceding years to be property of the State and established a procedure for apportioning the grain reserves.”21  Declaring the grain to be property of the state was a bold and probably necessary move on the Government’s part. Many peasants had become frustrated by the low price of grain versus the high price of consumer goods, and had chosen to hold on to their grain stores in hopes of selling it at better prices later on.22 

On May 20, 1917, the Central Land Committee adopted a declaration to the effect that reforms be based on the principle that “all agrarian lands must be transferred to the use of the toiling agricultural population.”23 The motif of “toiling hands” became prevalent in public discourse, particularly employed by the Provisional Government, as in its July 8th declaration: “With regard to the agricultural question, the Provisional Government is convinced… (that) future agricultural reforms must be based on the principle of transferring land to the toilers.”24

The July 8th declaration, made in response to the July Days, featured outlines of a number of other principles of the Provisional Government’s land and grain policies:

1. Complete doing away with the old agrarian policy which ruined and disorganized the agricultural community.

2. Measures safeguarding the complete freedom of the Constituent Assembly as to the distribution of the country’s land reserves.

4. The elimination by means of legal regulation of land relations of that grave danger with which the State and the future agrarian  reform is threatened , such as land seizures and similar arbitrary local methods of solving land needs… 25

At the same time as it was making proclamations about transferring land to the people willing and able to work it, it was in the end restricted by its own temporariness and the fact that land reform was considered to be up to the imminent Constituent Assembly. Such was even admitted by the Government. It was over the issue of land reform that Prince L’vov ended up resigning from the Government: “Such infringement upon the rights of the Constituent Assembly is the implementation of the proposed agricultural program.”26

The Government’s failure to procure grain in the end was critical, and the Bolshevik credo “Peace, Land, Bread!” became all the more appealing to urban and working Russia. Izvestiia cited it as a key failure for the government in a piece commemorating the resignation of Peshnekhonov: “(State authority made demands) to peasants to force them to sell their grain at established moderate prices, fixed by the state… precisely the opposite was done… The tendency toward voluntary sacrifices proved to be a utopian ideal, and the Government had no sufficient power to employ compulsory measure.”27

Interestingly, it is in the July Days and their after-math that one can find a good deal of further evidence that there was indeed a real political culture of the Provisional Government. The actual activities and disorders of those early days of July, 1917, can be said to be counter to real political culture in spirit. It was confusion and frustration, likely fed by degrees of agitation from various angles difficult to gauge, that created the disruptions in the capital and elsewhere. That variety of social action is not based on desire for a normalized and inclusive political life. This is not to say that protesters were unjustified and entirely anti-democracy- such could only be argued if we presume that the Provisional Government was necessarily right. Nonetheless, it is the response to the July Days events that show the most democratic character.

Reaction to uprising was sharp and intensely critical of the Bolsheviks from not only the right and the middle, but also the left-wing. As might be expected, the journal Rech’ was quick to note the failures of the Bolsheviks: “Let us speak bluntly: Bolshevism is hopelessly comprised; the absurdity of its revolt, which assumed all the features of disgusting hoodlumism, seemed simply incomprehensible until the shameful accusation of being a hireling of the Germans was flung at Lenin… Bolshevism proved to be a bluff.”28

Besides harsh anti-Bolshevism, Rech’s response to the July Days shared another thing in common with the general response: Bolshevism was declared essentially dead almost universally. As Rech’ expressed, “at a moment, there occurred an exceptionally sharp change of feelings, and Bolshevism died, so to speak, a sudden death.”29 Izvestiia and Rabochaia Gazeta echoed exactly this sentiment.

The widely proclaimed political death of Bolshevism is very important to the question of political culture. The reason Bolshevism had died was not only its failure to seize all power, but because it had betrayed democracy. The first revolution of 1917 can thus be understood as a democratic revolution. Statements by the Government frequently carried such a description of the new Russian Republic, typically, “the” or “our Revolutionary Democracy.”

Rabochaia Gazeta’s response emphasized this the most in their article entitled “The Dangers Stemming From the Bolshevik Attempts”: “Bolshevik tactics- as we’ve asserted- lead to isolation of the revolutionary proletariat.”30 It is interesting that, while remaining highly critical of Bolshevism, Rabochaia Gazeta proudly wears its socialist affinities here. The article continues to argue that Bolshevism was leaving the door open for counterrevolutionary activity. In its conclusion, it again emphasizes the democratic nature of the revolution: “The organs of Revolutionary Democracy succeeded in liquidating the armed insurrection of soldiers and sailors drawn into the adventure.”

It was Izvestiia that had the harshest words for the Bolsheviks though. Its article parodying the laughably absurd Bolshevik proclamations of July 5th declaring the collapse of the Provisional Government and the achievement of all Bolshevik goals in the uprising is the sharpest yet most succinct expression of the sentiments of liberals and social democrats:

Bolsheviks claimed on the 5th that the demonstrations of the 3rd and 4th achieved its aims. What did they achieve? They achieved the death of 400 workers, sailors, women, and children; they achieved the destruction and looting of private shops; they succeeded in weakening our front; they attempted to seize the counter-intelligence department where all information on German espionage is kept; and they achieved dissension and a mutual animosity between individual parts of the democracy.31

These reactions are far more potent than the type of Autocratic-apologist literature produced by the press pre-1905. They display a devotion to more than the persons of the Provisional Government. It is noteworthy that not one name of one member of the Provisional Government is praised or criticized in any of the July Days reactions. The devotion is to the free participation in a free political life in Russia that is persistently expressed in the days following the insurrection. Seizure of power by any force is categorically attacked as counterrevolutionary of anti-democratic.

The Provisional Government’s own declaration of July 8 mirrors much of these ideas: “The Provisional Government has confidence in the rapid recuperation of the political life of the country now that the contagious sickness which shook the national organism has declared itself and burned itself out in an acute crisis.”32 The contagious sickness here is clearly Bolshevism, echoing the wide-spread belief that Bolshevism was politically (not unequivocally however) dead. Also notable is the emphasis on “political life.” The Provisional Government could have said something that expressed better a sense that it had been attacked and it had defeated Bolshevism. Instead, it was the democratic political culture of Russia that was being said to have defeated its assailants.

Also interesting about the declaration of the Government is the insistence that it will safe-guard the Constituent Assembly. The Provisional Government had generally been seen for some time as the vanguard of the Constituent Assembly, despite Bolshevik insistence that the Provisional Government had plotted the demise of the Constituent Assembly. This belief was widely held on to even to ’til the Government had officially been defeated, as can be seen in Izvestiia’s response to the Bolshevik seizure of power: “We repeat that this is not a transfer of power to the Soviets, but a seizure of power by one party- the Bolsheviks.”33

The last question that needs to be asked about the July Days is whether or not the anti-Bolshevism response seen from the 5th of July onwards was essentially anti-German, or genuinely pro-democratic. In truthfulness, it is only on the 5th that the masses seemed to come decisively to the Provisional Government’s side, and “neutral” military units come to the Government’s aid.34

For the Provisional Government’s part, they did not always shy away from using the German funding of the Bolsheviks as ammunition. Kerenskii typically avoided mentioning this in his public criticisms of the Bolsheviks. Still, the July 8th declaration of the Provisional Government did not hesitate to call out “traitors” in explaining the German victory’s on the Western front. Attached to the announcement that Germans had broken through the front of the Revolutionary Army was a harsh admonition for the Bolsheviks: “This terrible operation was facilitated for them by the criminal levity and blind fanaticism of some and the treachery of others.”35

Still, the core of the Provisional Government maintained a surprisingly strong devotion to the principles of the rule of Law and a reasonable political solution to the problems it faced in the uprising. Kerenskii, L’vov, Nekrasov, and Tereshchenko all came out within the week with statements of their outrage over the public release of the intelligence connecting the Bolsheviks to the Germans. Tereshchenko was particularly active in his public response to Pereverzev’s decision to publish the intelligence. A concern for the foundations of Rechtstaat are evident in his lamentation over the violation of due process: “Despite the desirability of creating a decisive change of mood among certain strata of the population, we agreed that the publication of the documents would be possible only after all the culprits were in our hands.”36 While Nekrasov’s main concern seemed to be the damage to the Government’s ability to track down the Bolsheviks, Kerenskii, L’vov, and Tereshchenko seemed to be genuinely concerned for the implications to Russia’s new social and political culture.

Up until the Kornilov fiasco, Russia’s political culture is fairly easy to track and showed many signs of vitality. It is simply too difficult to say, examining the primary documentation available, whether or not it was truly alive thereafter. Bolshevik statements became increasingly inflammatory and unreasonable. Editorials adopted a much shallower analysis of the political situation, and most retreated into predictable rhetoric. Increasingly, the need for a “strong Government” was emphasized, as in Russkoe Vedomostii’s editorial on Peshnekhonov’s resignation. There was yet one expression of political thought: the need for the Constituent Assembly.

On October 24th, Kerenskii made a speech to the Council of the Russian Republic. In it, he expressed the dire need for the Provisional Government to hold on to power long enough to oversee the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. He also had to admit, however, that it was becoming increasingly difficult to hold on to hope that that goal would be realized: “Of late, the nearer we come to the day of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly- which will establish forever a free, democratic system of government in Russia- the more persistent, arrogant, and insolent become the attempts of the two wings of Russian public opinion to block and eliminate the possibility of convoking the Constituent Assembly.”37

The belief that the Constituent Assembly was to be the final, grand achievement of the Revolution was so intense, so deep-seated in Russia’s contemporary political culture that Rabochaia Put’ published a note from the Bolsheviks shortly before the Bolshevik seizure of power ensuring that the transfer of power to the newly Bolshevik controlled Soviets would actually be putting the fate of the Constituent Assembly in more trustworthy hands:

Since the first days of the Revolution the capitalists and Pomeshchiki, agreeing to the convening of the Constituent Assembly in words, have sabotaged it in fact… we say to the people in order for the Constituent Assembly to take place, in order for the popular masses to participate intelligently and freely in the elections… it is necessary that an end be put to all the intrigues, all the conspiracies of the counterrevolution.38

Besides betraying a certain degree of paranoia of the so-called “bourgeoisie” on the part of the Bolsheviks, this again confirms the almost universal wish for the Constituent Assembly. Of course, it can be seen as thoroughly a bit of lip-service when coming from the Bolsheviks- considering what they actually did when the time came for the long-waited Constituent Assembly to convene- it is a recognition of the democratic political culture of Russia at the time.

In conclusion, a political culture of relative size existed in Russia during the months of the Provisional Government. if the Kornilov affair was not the death of Russia’s political culture in reality, there can be no doubt that it died when the Constituent Assembly was crushed by the Bolsheviks. Up until that point though, the multi-faction commitment to the establishment of a political life in Russia was remarkable. Whether or not it was merely a continuation of that political culture that spawned the 1905 revolution, and whether or not this political culture can be said to have survived in any way is another question entirely. Merely recognizing the existence, however tenuous or small, of a political culture during this period is sufficiently momentous.

Notes

1. “The Proclamation of the Provisional Committee of the Duma of the Provisional Government,” in A Source book for Russian history from early times to 1917 vol. III, ed. George Vernadsky and Ralph T. Fisher, Jr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 881.

2. “Aleksander F. Kerensky,” in The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History, ed. Joseph L. Wieczynski (U.S.: Academic International Press, 1976), vol. 16, 106.

3. “The Resignation of Peshnekhonov and the Increase in Economic Disorder,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1640.

4. “An Appeal From the Kadets,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1199.

5. “Vote of the 7th Congress of the Kadets in Favor of a Democratic Parliamentary Republic,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1200.

6. “Resolution of the Congress on a Democratic Republic,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1201.

7. “Socialist Revolutionary Support for the Provisional Government,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1203.

8. Ibid., 1204.

9. “Izvestiia on the Question of Soviet Participation in or Collaboration with the Provisional Government,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1210.

10. Ibid., 1204.

11. “The Declaration of the Provisional Government Reviewing its Accomplishments and Calling for the Support and Cooperation of all the Vital Forces in the Nation,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1249.

12. Robert Paul Browder, “July Days,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1331.

13. “Order No. 1,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. II, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 848.

14. “The Officers and the Soviets,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. II, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 849.

15. Ibid.

16. “Order No. 1,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. II, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 848.

17. “The Officers and the Soviets,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. II, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 849.

18. “The Demands of the Central Committee of the Officers’ Union of the Army and Navy,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. II, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 878.

19. “General Ruzskii’s Speech,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1750.

20. “Tereshchenko’s Speech,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1419.

21. “The Declaration of the Provisional Government Reviewing its Accomplishments and Calling for the Support and Cooperation of all the Vital Forces in the Nation,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1249.

22. Robert Paul Browder, “Up to July,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. II, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 479.

23. Ibid.

24. “The Declaration of the Provisional Government,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1185.

25. Ibid., 1186.

26. “Statement by Prince L’vov Concerning His Resignation,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1388.

27. “The Resignation of Peshnekhonov and the Increase in Economic Disorder,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1640.

28. “Rech’ on The Results of the Uprising,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1362.

29. Ibid.

30. “The Dangers Stemming From the Bolshevik Attempt,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1362.

31. “Achievements of the Bolshevik Uprising,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1363.

32. “The Declaration of the Provisional Government,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1185.

33. “Izvestiia on Seizure of Power,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1801.

34. Robert Paul Browder, “July Days,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1331.

35. “The Declaration of the Provisional Government,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1186.

36. “The Views of Tershchenko, Nekrasov, and Kerensky on the Charges Against the Bolsheviks and on the Resignation of Pereverzev,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1367.

37. “Kerensky’s Speech Before the Council of the Republic,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1772.

38. “Rabochaia Put’ Promising that the Convocation of the Constituent Assembly Will Be Assured If All Power is Transferred to the Soviets,” in The Russian Provisional Government 1917, vol. III, ed. Robert P. Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1397.